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down by Georgia appellate courts between June 1, 2005 and May 31,
2006. The cases surveyed fall primarily within five categories: (1)
condemnation, (2) restrictive covenants, (3) easements, (4) zoning, and
(5) miscellaneous.
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CONDEMNATION

During the survey period, Georgia appellate courts decided several
condemnation cases, many of which did not involve novel issues. The
Georgia Court of Appeals did, however, consider one case with an
interesting temporary work easement issue. Furthermore, in two other
cases, the Georgia Court of Appeals examined the proper legal and
evidentiary basis for an award of business loss damages. Two different
panels of the court, with one common judge, held business losses
appropriate in the first case and precluded business losses in the second.
A.

Temporary Work Easement

1
In Georgia 400 IndustrialPark v. Departmentof Transportation,
the
Georgia Department of Transportation ("DOT") filed a petition and
declaration of taking pursuant to Official Code of Georgia Annotated
("O.C.G.A.") sections 32-3-1 to 32-3-202 to acquire certain land for
transportation purposes and the right to dismantle and remove a
building sitting partly on the condemned land and partly on adjacent
land, as well as a temporary work easement to enter the adjacent land
for purposes of removing the building. The condemnees filed a motion
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 32-3-11 to set aside, vacate, and annul the
declaration of taking, arguing in part that the declaration failed to
provide a sufficient description of the temporary work easement. The
trial court denied the motion. 3
In an interlocutory appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court with respect to the temporary work easement.4 The court of
appeals noted that the Georgia Supreme Court has consistently held
that a condemning body seeking to acquire an easement must describe
the easement with the same degree of definiteness required for a land
deed.5 A condemnee is entitled to have an accurate, definite description
of the property it is to lose and nothing must be left open to the
judgment or interpretation of another.' The appellate court determined
that the language of the temporary work easement did not provide the
width of the easement or any limitation regarding a pathway to be
utilized when traversing the adjacent land.7 Although the DOT argued

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

274 Ga. App. 153, 616 S.E.2d 903 (2005).
O.C.G.A. §§ 32-3-1 to -20 (2006).
Georgia 400 IndustrialPark, 274 Ga. App. at 153, 616 S.E.2d at 905.
Id. at 154, 616 S.E.2d at 905.
Id., 616 S.E.2d at 906.
Id.
Id. at 155, 616 S.E.2d at 906.
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that the description contained a temporal limitation, the appellate court
held that the limitation did not convey even a hint of the extent of the
physical invasion contemplated.8
The court of appeals also rejected the DOT's argument that the issue
was moot because the building was dismantled during the pendency of
the interlocutory appeal.9 The court noted that due process requires a
condemnee to be provided a legally sufficient description of its land
interest sought to be acquired and that this type of description is
required for the easement to be accurately valued for purposes of just
and adequate compensation. ° Based on this, the court remanded the
case with instructions to the trial court requiring the DOT to amend the
declaration of taking to provide an accurate and legally sufficient
description of the land it traversed, along with the period of time it was
used, for purposes of determining the value of the land taken or
consequential damages to land not taken."
Business Loss Damages
The Georgia Court of Appeals decided two cases during the survey
period that involved business loss damages. In one case, the appellate
court determined that the business loss award for a well-established
business was not too speculative and remote. However, in another case,
the court held that such an award was precluded when the business was
not established and the award was based on speculative evidence of
business losses.
In Carroll County v. L.J.S. Grease & Tallow,'2 the county water
authority condemned 37.959 acres of land for construction of a reservoir.
A special master awarded the condemnee $140,000 as the market value
of the property taken. The condemnee appealed the award and
demanded a jury trial. By consent of the parties, the case was heard by
a court-appointed arbitrator with further right of appeal. The arbitrator
awarded the condemnee $265,000 as the value of the land and $1,250,000 for business loss damages. The water authority appealed, arguing
that the business loss damages were too speculative and remote.' 3
The condemnee had operated a long-established grease rendering plant
on the condemned land. Grease rendering plants perform a sanitation
service for restaurants by collecting used grease for a pickup fee and
B.

8. Id.
9. Id. at 156, 616 S.E.2d at 907.
10. Id. at 157, 616 S.E.2d at 908.
11. Id. at 158, 616 S.E.2d at 908.
12. 274 Ga. App. 353, 617 S.E.2d 612 (2005).
13. Id. at 353, 617 S.E.2d at 614.
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then converting the grease into an end product, which is sold for use in
animal feed, cosmetics, and lubricants. When the water authority
announced its intent to construct the reservoir, the condemnee began
losing its customers due to the threatened closure of the plant.
Therefore, the condemnee began winding down plant operations until its
federal permits expired. Subsequently, the water authority filed its
petition to condemn approximately one-half of the condemnee's
acreage.' 4
The water authority challenged the business loss award on the ground
that the condemnee had ceased operations more than a year before the
condemnation and that the award violated the general rule that business
losses occurring before the date of taking are not recoverable." The
Georgia Court of Appeals, however, rejected this argument on the ground
that when the "imminency of a condemnation forces an established
business to close before the date of condemnation, the absence of a
business in operation on the property on the date of taking does not
automatically end all inquiry into the relevancy of business loss
evidence." 6
The water authority also challenged the business loss award on the
ground that the condemnee failed to relocate the grease rendering
plant. 7 The appellate court rejected this argument as well, holding
that the evidence showed that the condemnee found an alternate plant
site, but that the water authority refused to help relocate the plant
because the estimated cost of relocation was in excess of two million
dollars.' 8 Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that the arbitrator
was authorized to find that the water authority bore responsibility for
not relocating the plant.19 Recognizing that a condemnee may be
required to relocate a business to mitigate business loss damages, the
court held that where the estimated relocation costs exceed the value of
the business, as in this case, the condemnee cannot be charged with a
failure to mitigate damages by not relocating.2 °
The water authority also challenged the amount of the business loss
award as remote and speculative. 2' The court of appeals noted that a
condemnee may recover business losses as a separate item if it operated

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 353-54, 617 S.E.2d at 614-15.
Id. at 354, 617 S.E.2d at 615.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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an established business on the property, if the loss is not remote or
speculative, and if the property is unique.22 First, the court held that
23
the condemnee's grease rendering plant was an established business.
Next, the court held that "[biased on evidence showing that grease
rendering plants are not generally bought and sold on the open market,
the arbitrator was authorized to find the property unique."2 4
Finally, the court of appeals determined that the business loss
damages were not too speculative or remote to warrant recovery.25 The
court first reviewed Georgia Supreme Court authority that allows a
condemnee to recover for the destruction of an established business as
a separate item of recovery in addition to the value of the underlying
real estate. 26 The court then noted that the general rule, "that lost
profits are too speculative to authorize a direct recovery, is not necessarily a bar to the admission of evidence of lost profits to aid in establishing
the value of a business."27 After reviewing in detail the business
valuation evidence, which included the condemnee's total capital
investment in the plant, an appraiser's determination of the plant's
asset-based value, and an appraiser's determination of the plant's
income-based value, the court held that the business loss award was well
within the range of the evidence presented. 28 Accordingly, the court of
appeals affirmed the condemnation award.2 9
In Georgia Power Co. v. Jones,3 however, the court of appeals held
that the condemnees were precluded from seeking business loss damages
separately from the lost value to their land, and that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting speculative evidence of business
losses. 31 In 1997 the Joneses purchased mountain property, which had.
space for a lodge, six cottages, nature trails, and a pond. In 1999 the
Joneses built a road to the property and began constructing a lodge. In
the spring of 2001, Georgia Power notified the Joneses that it intended
to seek an easement across their property for a power line with tall
towers. Because the Joneses were concerned about the negative impact
of the power line on their business, they delayed the development of the
other planned improvements. They continued construction of the lodge,

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id. at 355, 617 S.E.2d at 615.
Id. at 356, 617 S.E.2d at 616.
Id.
Id. (citing Bowers v. Fulton County, 221 Ga. 731, 739, 146 S.E.2d 884, 891 (1966)).
Id.
Id. at 356-57, 617 S.E.2d at 617.
Id. at 358, 617 S.E.2d at 617.
277 Ga. App. 332, 626 S.E.2d 554 (2006).
Id. at 332, 626 S.E.2d at 555.
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which was substantially complete in the fall of 2002. In November 2002
Georgia Power filed a condemnation action for a power line easement
2
approximately 1000 feet from the back of the lodge.1
A special master awarded the Joneses $26,000 as the actual fair market
value of the condemned property and $5880 for consequential damages.33 The Joneses filed an exception to the special master's award and
a jury trial followed. The Joneses claimed that the power lines
completely destroyed their plans for a bed and breakfast inn, and they
sought damages for the loss of the business separately from, and in
addition to, the damages for the value of the property taken. At trial,
Georgia Power objected to evidence of the Joneses' business losses on the
ground that the Joneses were not ready to open the business and had
not yet earned any income from the business.34
The trial court
overruled the objections and allowed the Joneses to present evidence of
the value of the bed and breakfast business "as it existed at the time of
the taking."35
Despite the fact that there were only four rooms potentially available
for customers at the time of the taking, Mrs. Jones testified that her
ballpark estimate of the potential gross income for the bed and breakfast
was $60,000 per month, which was based on future plans to build
twenty-four rooms and a projected 50% occupancy rate for those rooms
at $150 per night. Mrs. Jones's testimony also included an estimate of
$3000 per month in income from hosting weddings. Moreover, she did
not testify about potential expenses or the value of the business at the
time of the taking. The testimony of other witnesses, such as a bed and
breakfast consultant, was also based on hypothetical figures and
estimates. Nonetheless, the jury awarded the Joneses $1,003,500 in
damages. Georgia Power filed a motion for new trial, which the trial
court denied, and then Georgia Power appealed. 6
On appeal, Georgia Power argued that the trial court erred in
admitting speculative evidence regarding business losses for the bed and
breakfast when the business was not yet in operation or otherwise
"established."37 Additionally, Georgia Power asserted that even if it is
not necessary to have an established business to recover business losses,
the Joneses' evidence of potential future earnings was based on
assumptions regarding occupancy rates, possible special event bookings,

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 332-33, 626 S.E.2d at 555-56.
Id. at 332, 626 S.E.2d at 555.
Id. at 333, 626 S.E.2d at 556.
Id.
Id. at 333-34, 626 S.E.2d at 556.
Id. at 334, 626 S.E.2d at 556.
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and other factors that were too speculative to support the jury's
verdict.3 8 The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed.3 9
The appellate court started with the general rule that a condemnee
may recover business losses as a separate item if it operated an
established business on the property, if the loss is not remote or
speculative, and if the property is unique. 40 However, the court then
noted that a condemnee may not recover separate business loss damages
for projected profits from an unexecuted business plan.4 1 After a
detailed review of the evidence and case law, the court of appeals held
that the Joneses failed to demonstrate that they had an established
business at the time of the taking and that the Joneses' evidence of
potential future income was too speculative to support an award for loss
of business.42
II.
A.

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

Amendment of Restrictive Covenant

In Brockway v. Harkleroad,"' the court considered a subdivision
developed in 1987 as a 112-lot residential community." Each lot was
encumbered with a "Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions," which
was recorded in 1988 and applied uniformly to each lot.45 The declaration stated that the covenants and restrictions ran with the land for
twenty years and:
thereafter shall be automatically extended for successive ten-year
periods unless seventy-five percent of the lot owners terminate the
duration of the covenants and restrictions prior to the commencement
of any such ten-year period ...

. "These covenants and restrictions

may be amended during the first twenty (20) years from the date of
this Declaration, by an instrument signed by not less than ninety
percent (90%) of the Lot Owners and thereafter by an instrument
signed by not less than seventy-five (75%) of the Lot Owners." 46

38. Id., 626 S.E.2d at 556-57.
39. Id., 626 S.E.2d at 557.
40. Id. at 335, 626 S.E.2d at 557 (citing Davis Co. v. Dep't of Transp., 262 Ga. App. 138,
139, 584 S.E.2d 705, 707 (2003)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 337, 626 S.E.2d at 558.
43. 273 Ga. App. 339, 615 S.E.2d 182 (2005).
44. Id. at 339, 615 S.E.2d at 183.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 339-40, 615 S.E.2d at 183-84.
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The subdivision failed; after twelve years, only eighteen homes had
been built and the developers had abandoned the project. Subsequently,
investors purchased all but three lots in the subdivision, comprising
more than ninety percent of the landowners. Those landowners recorded
an instrument amending the duration provisions of the declaration to
provide that instead of running for twenty years-from 1988 to
2008-the covenants and restrictions ran for fifteen years through
May 30, 2003. One homeowner in the subdivision opposed the amendment. The investors filed an action for declaratory judgment. The trial
court granted summary judgment to the investors and the hold-out
landowner appealed.47 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court.48
The declaration expressly provided that it could be amended during the
initial 20-year period by the agreement of at least 90 percent of the lot
owners. Since the declaration was recorded, all those buying lots in
the subdivision were charged with notice of and were bound by the
amendment provision along with all other provisions in the declaration
.... Accordingly, the investors, acting as more than 90 percent of the
lot owners, were entitled to enforce the clear written provisions of the
declaration binding all the lot owners, and to use the amendment
provision in any manner not contrary to law or public policy.49

B.

Challenge to Payment of Homeowners Association Fees
In Croft v. FairfieldPlantationProperty Owners Ass'n,5 ° the plaintiff

purchased a total of seven residential lots in the defendant subdivision
at a tax sale that resulted from unpaid property taxes. The lots were
subject to restrictive covenants requiring payment of homeowners'
association assessment for maintenance of common areas.51
One
provided that:
Every person upon acquiring title, legal or equitable, to any lot in the
Subdivision[ I shall become a member of the [Fairfield Plantation]
Property Owners Association, Inc., a Georgia non-profit corporation,
herein referred to as "Association" and as long as he is the owner of
any such lot, he must remain a member of the Association. Such
membership is not intended to apply to those persons who hold an
interest in any lot merely as security for the performance of an
obligation to pay money, e.g., mortgages, deeds of trust, or real estate

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 340, 615 S.E.2d at 184.
Id. at 342, 615 S.E.2d at 185.
Id. at 340-41, 615 S.E.2d at 184 (citations omitted).
276 Ga. App. 311, 623 S.E.2d 531 (2005).
Id. at 312, 623 S.E.2d at 532.
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contract purchases. However, if such a person should realize upon his
security and become the real owner of a lot, he will then be subject to
all the requirements and limitations imposed in these Restrictions on
owners of lots within the Subdivision and on members of the Association, including those provisions with respect to payment of annual
charges. 2
The plaintiff refused to pay the annual charges. When the homeowners association later hired a collection agency and filed liens against the
properties, the plaintiff filed suit against the association and others.
The association counterclaimed for unpaid assessments, late charges,
interest, and attorney fees. The trial court granted summary judgment
to the defendant on the plaintiff's claims and granted summary
judgment to the defendant on its counterclaims.53
On appeal, the plaintiff maintained that the title he acquired in the
tax sale was insufficient to trigger membership in the association and an
obligation to pay annual assessments.5 4
In support of this argument, [the plaintiff] points to the statutory right
of redemption granted to his predecessors in title. [The relevant
statute] provides that title can be restored to specified predecessors
through payment of the statutory amount of redemption within 12
months from the date of the sale, or at any time before the right to
redeem is foreclosed by the tax sale purchaser giving of the notice
under [the relevant statute]. Another mechanism by which the
purchaser at a tax sale can cut off the right of redemption is through
adverse possession of the property for the requisite number of years
after the tax deed is recorded. [The plaintiff] argues that since he did
not exercise his right to cut off the right of redemption through either
(1) the giving of notice 12 months after the tax sale; or (2) adversely
possessing the property, he does not have fee simple title and is not
obligated to pay the Association's assessments. 55
The court rejected this argument, determining that the plaintiff's
interest was sufficient to render the purchaser liable for homeowners'
association assessments. 56 The court noted that "[a] contrary holding
would result in a situation in which a tax deed purchaser could, by
inaction, keep the redemption period alive indefinitely, reap the benefit

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 312-13, 623 S.E.2d at 532-33.
Id. at 313, 623 S.E.2d at 533.
Id.
Id. at 314, 623 S.E.2d at 533.
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of property value increases, and avoid the obligation to pay maintenance
expenses which increase the value of the property.""
III.

EASEMENTS

A. A Plat's Notations Cannot Vary or Expand the Access Rights
Conveyed in a Deed
In Department of Transportationv. Meadow TRace, Inc.," the Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed the Georgia Court of Appeals decision to affirm
the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to Meadow Trace. 9
Meadow Trace's predecessor in interest conveyed tracts of land to the
Georgia Department of Transportation ("DOT") in 1966, including access
rights to Interstate 985 ("1-985"). The deed described the access rights
by metes and bounds and noted the plat of the property. Subsequently,
the DOT filed an action to condemn portions of Meadow Trace's property,
located at the intersection of 1-985 and U.S. Highway 129 in Hall
County. During the condemnation action, the DOT contended that when
Meadow Trace's predecessor in interest conveyed property to the DOT
in 1966 for the construction of 1-985, notations on the plat incorporated
into the deed also conveyed the access rights to Highway 129. At the
same time, Meadow Trace contended the 1966 conveyance was limited
to the metes and bounds described on the deed and did not include the
access rights from Meadow Trace's remaining lands to Highway 129.'
The Georgia Supreme Court applied the cardinal rule of construction,
which is to ascertain the intention of the parties.61 It affirmed the
Georgia Court of Appeals, holding that the 1966 deed only conveyed
access rights to 1-985, not Highway 129.62 In addition, the Georgia
Supreme Court cited Wooten v. Solomon 63 and Johnson v. Willingham6 for support in holding that a plat's notations incorporated into
a deed cannot vary or expand the access rights conveyed on a deed.65
Independent of the cardinal rule and case law, the Georgia Supreme
Court also concluded that the plat itself did not support the DOT's
interpretation regarding the access rights to Highway 129 because the

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
280 Ga. 720, 631 S.E.2d 359 (2006).
Id. at 723, 631 S.E.2d at 362.
Id. at 720-21, 631 S.E.2d at 360.
Id. at 721, 631 S.E.2d at 361.
Id. at 723, 631 S.E.2d at 362.
139 Ga. 433, 77 S.E. 375 (1913).
212 Ga. 310, 92 S.E.2d 1 (1956).
Meadow Trace, 280 Ga. at 722, 631 S.E.2d at 361-62.
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specific notation on the plat is on the border between Meadow Trace's
property and a tract the plat shows was to be acquired pursuant to a
different project.66
B.

Scope of Easements

67
In Municipal Electric Authority v. Gold-Arrow Farms,
the Georgia
Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in
part the trial court's judgment that the easements at issue limit the use
of a fiber optic line to internal communications by the appellants and
that the general telecommunications use of the line by the appellants
exceeds the scope of the easements."
The appellees sought class action certification to represent similarlysituated landowners, an award of actual and punitive damages based on
claims for trespass on the easements, breach of easement agreements,
malicious interference with the easements, unjust enrichment, estoppel,
and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. They also sought
injunctive and declaratory relief. Georgia Power possessed easement
rights to construct and operate electric transmission, distribution, and
communication lines across the appellees' property. The owners of the
land traversed by the easements, including Gold-Arrow Farms, filed
action against the appellants asking the trial court to declare that the
easements limited the use of the fiber optic line to internal communications by the appellants related to the transmission and distribution of
electricity, and that the use of the easement for general telecommunications exceeded the scope of the easement.69 The appellants contended
the easement to construct electric communication lines also granted the
right to construct lines over which communications are transmitted. v
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's holding that
the easements prohibited use for general telecommunications. 7' The
Georgia Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the easements
granting the right to construct electric transmission, distribution, and
communication lines also granted the right to construct electric
transmission lines, electric distribution lines, and electric communication
lines.72 Using the cardinal rule of construction,73 the Georgia Court

66. Id. at 722-23, 631 S.E.2d at 362.
67. 276 Ga. App. 862, 625 S.E.2d 57 (2005).
68. Id. at 862, 872, 625 S.E.2d at 58, 65.
69. Id. at 862-63, 625 S.E.2d at 58-59.
70. Id. at 864, 625 S.E.2d at 60.
71. Id. at 867, 625 S.E.2d at 61.
72. Id., 625 S.E.2d at 62.
73. Id. at 866, 625 S.E.2d at 61.
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of Appeals ascertained that the clear and unambiguous intent of the
parties was to grant easements for electric communication lines without
any limit prohibiting use for general telecommunications, 4 and that
the trial court erroneously considered matters outside the easements to
find that the parties intended to exclude a general telecommunications
use. 5 The Georgia Court of Appeals also held that the use of the fiber
optic communication line instead of an electric communication line is a
change in the manner or degree of the granted use to accommodate a
new technology and is within the scope of the easements. 7v Based on
its holding that the easements did permit a general telecommunications
use, the Georgia Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court to
determine whether the exclusive easements in gross were divisible and
whether the sale, lease, or license of communication capacity to third
parties was done within the scope of the easements.77
C. Use and Enjoyment of Recreation Easement
In Savannah Jaycees Foundation v. Gottlieb v the Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment that parking on a property
was necessary for the grantee's use of a recreation easement but
modified the trial court's order to allow parking anywhere on the
property as overly broad.79 Subdivision residents and community
organizations used a park in the Groveland Subdivision Part Three to
which the Savannah Jaycees Foundation acquired title in 1986. Since
at least 1963 the subdivision residents and members of the adjacent
synagogue parked their cars on the northern part of the property. Later,
an assisted living facility was built on the western boundary of the
property, outside the subdivision. After the facility opened, its residents,
employees, and visitors parked their vehicles on the property. The
Jaycees sent the facility a letter asking it not to use the property as
overflow parking and notified it of the illegal alterations the facility
made to the property. When the facility ignored the letter, the Jaycees
began constructing an eight-foot wooden fence along its western
boundary with the facility. In addition, the Jaycees placed the framing
for a fence along the edge of the property facing the public road. The

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 867, 625 S.E.2d at 61.
Id. at 869, 625 S.E.2d at 63.
Id.
Id. at 870, 625 S.E.2d at 63-64.
273 Ga. App. 374, 615 S.E.2d 226 (2005).
Id. at 377, 615 S.E.2d at 229.
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appellees filed a declaratory judgment action against the Jaycees
because the Jaycees began erecting the fence.8"
The trial court held that the appellees were entitled to free and open
access to the property at all times, including automobile parking."' The
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that parking
was necessary and reasonable for the use of the recreational easement,
but it modified the trial court's holding by limiting the parking rights of
residents and synagogue members because free and open access to the
property was unnecessary use of the easement. 2 The Georgia Court
of Appeals noted that the residents and synagogue members had been
parking on the property incident to their recreational use of the property
for more than forty years, the parking on the adjacent public street is
limited, the Jaycees never objected to the residents or synagogue
members parking before their dispute with the assisted living facility,
and the Jaycees also parked on the property during their weekly
meetings."
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that
the construction of the eight-foot fence on the western boundary of the4
property did not violate an easement of light and air in the property.
In affirming the trial court's finding, the Georgia Court of Appeals
applied the rule that unless an easement is exclusive, the grantor may
construct improvements on his land that do not substantially interfere
with the easement previously granted.8 5 The Georgia Court of Appeals
also cited the rule that "'[the right to the free passage of light and air
is subject to the superior right of the adjoining landowner to make use
of his property in good faith."'88 Using the aforementioned rules, the
Georgia Court of Appeals determined that the fence did not inhibit the
subdivision residents' access to the property and the fence was not built
out of malevolent intent; rather, the Jaycees intended to use the fence
to keep out unauthorized users.8 7

80. Id. at 374-75, 615 S.E.2d at 228. The appellees claimed that the Jaycees threatened
to tow the automobiles of the subdivision residents. Id. at 374, 615 S.E.2d at 227.
81. Id. at 377, 615 S.E.2d at 229.
82. Id. at 377-78,615 S.E.2d at 230 (citing Folk v. Meyerhardt Lodge, 218 Ga. 248,249,
127 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1962)).
83. Id. at 377, 615 S.E.2d at 229.
84. Id. at 379, 615 S.E.2d at 230-31.
85. Id. at 378-79, 615 S.E.2d at 230 (quoting Upson v. Stafford, 205 Ga. App. 615, 616,
422 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1992)).
86. Id. at 379, 615 S.E.2d at 231 (quoting S.A. Lynch Corp. v. Stone, 211 Ga. 516, 522,
87 S.E.2d 57, 62 (1955)).
87. Id.
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Requirements for Implied Easement

In Eardley v. McGreevey," a quiet title proceeding, a special master
determined that an implied easement had arisen in favor of Eardley
with respect to a gravel drive between the Eardley tract and the
McGreevey tract. The trial court then reversed the decision of the
special master.8 9 The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's order denying the existence of an implied easement in favor of
Eardley over McGreevey's property because the gravel drive was neither
necessary for access to the Eardley property nor was the plat showing
the drive recorded or referenced in Eardley's deed.9 °
In 1989 a one-acre tract fronting 150 feet on Jett Road was conveyed
to McGreevey. In 1997 McGreevey conveyed to Hutchins and Cole a
portion of his property fronting one hundred feet on Jett Road. The deed
conveying the property to Hutchins and Cole did not reference a recorded
plat and did not mention a gravel drive or any type of easement over the
portion retained by McGreevey. In 1998 Eardley purchased her property
from Hutchins and Cole and claimed to have an unrecorded and
unreferenced plat showing the gravel drive to Jett Road.91
The Georgia Court of Appeals stated that an implied easement may
arise when the owner of land conveys a portion of that land to another,
and the only access to a public road from the conveyed property is over
that portion of the property retained by the grantor.92 Applying that
rule, the court of appeals determined that the Eardley property borders
a public street known as Jett Road and that Eardley could access Jett
Road from her property without unreasonable difficulty.93 Further,
access to and from her property across the McGreevey property is
unnecessary and convenience is not a sufficient reason to establish an
implied easement.94
E.

Merger of Easement

In Tew v. Hinkle,95 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's dissolution of the temporary restraining order granted to Tew

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

279 Ga. 562, 615 S.E.2d 744 (2005).
Id. at 563, 615 S.E.2d at 745.
Id. at 563-64, 615 S.E.2d at 745-46.
Id. at 562-63, 615 S.E.2d at 744-45.
Id. at 563, 615 S.E.2d at 745.
Id.
Id.
273 Ga. App. 12, 614 S.E.2d 160 (2005).
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and dismissal of the complaint for injunctive relief.9" Tew's mother
deeded Tew Tract 1 of property that had been subdivided and owned by
Tew's family. In that same warranty deed, her mother conveyed to Tew
an easement across Tract 5 for the purpose of ingress and egress to
Tract 1. Three years later, Tew's mother conveyed Tract 5 to Tew and
her siblings. Five years later, Tew and her siblings sold Tract 5 to
Hinkle. Hinkle's purchase agreement did not reference the easement,
and the warranty deed conveying the property to Hinkle did not reserve
any interest in Tract 5.97
The Georgia Court of Appeals cited the rule that when there is a union
of absolute title to and possession of dominant and servient estates in
the same person, it operates to extinguish any existing easement. 98
Once Tew became a tenant in common with other owners of Tract 5, her
easement across it was extinguished.9 9 The court of appeals determined that Hinkle had no constructive knowledge of the easement
because it ceased to exist when Tew became an owner of Tract 5.1°°
The court also determined that Tew lost her easement because it was not
mentioned in the purchase contract or warranty deed conveying the
property to Hinkle.' ° '
F

Encroachments upon Easement

In Daiss v. Bennett, °2 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's conclusion that neither the Bennetts nor Daiss had a right
to encroach upon the shared easement." 3 The Bennetts, Daiss, and
others had been using Pamela Drive, a private turn-around, for more
than thirty-seven years to access their property and the Moon River boat
launch. "04
The trial court ordered Daiss to remove his garage from the turnaround because it substantially interfered with the turn-around's
purpose. The trial court did not order the removal of Daiss's fence, even
though it determined the fence encroached into the private drive,
because the fence did not substantially interfere with the enjoyment of
the easement.'0 5

96.

Id. at 12, 614 S.E.2d at 162.

97. Id.
98. Id.

99. Id.
100. Id. at 13, 614 S.E.2d at 162.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 13-14, 614 S.E.2d at 163 (citing Boyd v. Hand, 65 Ga. 468, 471 (1880)).
273 Ga. App. 784, 616 S.E.2d 114 (2005).
Id. at 784-85, 616 S.E.2d at 115.
Id. at 785, 616 S.E.2d at 115.

105. Id. at 786, 616 S.E.2d at 115-16.
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The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected Daiss's assertion that Margaret
Bennett gave him permission to build the garage and that his permissive
use ripened into a prescriptive easement. 10 6 First, the court of appeals
determined that others besides Ms. Bennett may enjoin a co-owner from
erecting obstructions on the street. 10 7 Second, Daiss had no claim of
prescriptive or adverse possession because he had not notified the owner
that he changed his position from licensee to prescriber.'
Third, even
if the building of the garage could have been considered sufficient notice
to the easement holders, the garage had been built only three years
prior, which is an insufficient period of use for a claim of prescriptive use
to arise.'0 9
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to order
removal of Daiss's fence."0 The Bennetts argued that Daiss's fence
reduced the width of Pamela Drive by fifteen percent and impeded traffic
flow; however, the court determined that the Bennetts failed to
demonstrate as a matter of law how the Daiss's fence substantially or
materially interfered with Bennett's easement or how the fence
adversely affected the easement."'
IV.

ZONING

A. Appeal of Administrative Zoning Decision to Supreme Court
Discretionary
In Ladzinske v. Allen," 2 an academy was operating a charter school
in DeKalb County. Beginning in 2001, the county considered the charter
school exempt from the local zoning ordinance, granting all necessary
building permits and certificates of occupancy. Several years later, the
county issued a permit for the construction of a new building. Six
months later, a neighbor objected to the construction and the county
13
placed construction on hold while conducting an investigation."
Ultimately the county "affirmed that the charter school is exempt from
the zoning ordinance, that the new building constitutes a valid accessory

106. Id., 616 S.E.2d at 116.
107. Id. at 786-87, 616 S.E.2d at 116.
108. Id. at 787, 616 S.E.2d at 116.
109. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-9-1 (2002) (describing the seven-year requirement for
prescriptive use)).
110. Id., 616 S.E.2d at 117.
111. Id., 616 S.E.2d at 116-17 (citing Upson v. Stafford, 205 Ga. App. 615, 617, 422

S.E.2d 882, 884 (1992)).
112. 280 Ga. 264, 626 S.E.2d 83 (2006).
113. Id. at 264, 626 S.E.2d at 84.
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use to the charter school's operations, and that the building permit was
properly issued."114 Three months after this decision and after construction resumed, the neighbor brought suit against the school and the
county for mandamus and injunctive and declaratory relief, among other
claims." 5
The superior court dismissed the neighbor's claims for mandamus and
declaratory relief on the ground of his failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. The court noted that the neighbor failed to appeal from the
issuance of the building permit to the county zoning board of appeals.
Further, the superior court denied an interlocutory injunction due to
laches and an extreme unlikelihood of success on the merits. The
superior court also denied the claim because the school had spent more
than $6.4 million on the project, and thus the, school's rights to the
building116permit had vested. The neighbor then filed a notice of direct
appeal.
The Georgia Supreme Court conceded that the matter was within its
jurisdiction." 7 However, the court decided it must determine whether
the neighbor was entitled to a direct appeal or must file an application
to appeal from the mandamus action."8 Ultimately, the court concluded that the neighbor was required to obtain permission to file the
appeal, and because he had not, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
matter: "Our holding is simply that the underlying subject matter
concerns the review of an administrative zoning decision and, therefore,
we have jurisdiction to
address the merits only in the context of a
9
discretionary appeal.""
B.

Homeowner Lacks Standing Without Showing Special Damages

In Massey v. Butts County,2 ° Reid owned property in Butts County.
He began building a barn on the property without first obtaining a
building permit. 121
After learning that a permit was required, he sought
and received one.
Massey owned property near Reid's. He challenged the issuance of the
building permit by filing an appeal to the Butts County Board of Zoning
Appeals ("the Board"). The Board denied the appeal and Massey

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 264-65, 626 S.E.2d at 84-85.
119. Id. at 266-67, 626 S.E.2d at 86.
120. 275 Ga. App. 478, 621 S.E.2d 479 (2005), cert. granted.
121. Id. at 478, 621 S.E.2d at 479.
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appealed to superior court. In his petition, he alleged that the barn
violated certain set-back provisions
and asked that the building permit
122
void.
and
null
declared
be
The superior court dismissed the appeal, holding that Massey lacked
standing because he had not demonstrated that he sustained special
damages. 2 ' Specifically, Massey pointed to a line of Georgia cases
that allowed a property owner to seek an injunction against the use of
property in its vicinity on the grounds that the proposed use violated the
relevant zoning ordinance. 24 The appellate court distinguished that
situation from the one at hand:
"By definition, an injunction provides relief from future wrongful
conduct: the remedy by injunction is to prevent, prohibit or protect
from future wrongs and does not afford a remedy for what is past."
Here, Massey does not actually seek an injunction-the permit has
already been granted and the barn is actually built. Rather, Massey
seeks the affirmative relief of having the building permit rescinded and
the barn destroyed. In other words, Massey is essentially challenging
the government's decision to grant Reid the building permit ....
[Because] Massey does not contend-much less demonstrate-that he
sustained special damages[,]... he lacks standing, and the trial court
properly dismissed his petition.'25
C.

Settlement Agreement between County Board of Commissioners

and Landowner Violates Zoning ProceduresLaw
In Buckner v. Douglas County,2 6 a real estate developer entered into
an agreement to purchase sixty-eight acres in Douglas County. At that
time, the Douglas County Zoning Ordinance allowed the developer to
build single-family homes on one-acre lots. The developer's contract to
purchase the sixty-eight acres was contingent upon his ability to obtain
the necessary building permits. After entering into the purchase
contract, the developer met with Douglas County's director of planning
and zoning, who assured the developer that his conceptual development
plan satisfied the county's existing zoning ordinance.' 2 7
Douglas County later amended its zoning ordinance to create various
watershed protection districts, which included the developer's property.

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 479, 621 S.E.2d at 480.
125. Id. at 479, 480, 621 S.E.2d at 480 (quoting Catrett v. Landmark Dodge, 253 Ga.
App. 639, 644, 560 S.E.2d 101, 106 (2002)).
126. 273 Ga. App. 765, 615 S.E.2d 850 (2005).
127. Id. at 765, 615 S.E.2d at 851.
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The amendment now required a minimum three-acre lot size for
residential developments, including that owned by the developer. After
learning of the amendment, the developer contacted the planning and
zoning director and was told that he would be "grandfathered" into the
prior zoning ordinance. The developer subsequently met with the
planning and zoning director, the chairman of the Douglas County Board
of Commissioners (the "Board"), and one other board member to discuss
his development plans. After the meeting, the developer sent a letter to
the director and chairman documenting his claim that he had acquired
a vested right to develop the tract in conforming with the zoning
regulations in effect prior to May 2002.12
Three board members
responded to that letter, stating that:
the Board had carefully reviewed Buckner's documentation and his
revised development plans (that incorporated upgrades not required
under regulations then or previously in effect). The letter advised
Buckner that, in view of his "substantial documentation" of his claim
of vested rights as well as his offer of community upgrades, the Board
had agreed as an offer of compromise and settlement of threatened
litigation to allow him to proceed with the modified development
plans.' 29
The Board placed certain conditions on the development to which the
developer agreed in writing. Later, however, the developer was told that
he would not be issued building permits because his proposed development plan specified one-acre lots, which violated the three-acre
minimum specified in the amendment. 3 °
The developer brought suit, seeking a writ of mandamus compelling
the county to issue permits authorizing him to develop his property
under the prior zoning classification. In support, he claimed that he had
acquired a vested right to do so by spending substantial sums of money
in reliance on assurances by county officials that such permits would be
issued and that the board had already agreed to do so by settling his
threatened litigation. At trial, the developer abandoned his claim of
vested rights and instead sought enforcement of the Board's letter as a
binding litigation settlement agreement.'
The trial court concluded
that the Board's attempt to allow the developer to develop the property
under the previous zoning ordinance was a nullity because the Board
failed to comply with the requirement of the Zoning Procedures Law

128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 765-66, 615 S.E.2d at 852.
Id. at 766, 615 S.E.2d at 852.
Id.
Id.
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("ZPL") 132 for notice and a hearing before a local government takes
action resulting3 4 in a zoning decision. 133 On review, the court of
appeals agreed:'
The Board's ...letter to Buckner, therefore, amounted to an agreement to amend the zoning ordinance to authorize [the developer] to
develop the property in conformity with the prior zoning classification
on certain conditions. Even though that did not constitute a zoning
ordinance amendment changing the text of the county zoning ordinance
...it constituted an amendment to the zoning ordinance rezoning (or
perhaps, re-rezoning) the property from one classification to another
.... The grant of such a request, even if motivated by a claim of
vested property rights by Buckner, still resulted in an amendment to
the zoning ordinance
that invoked the notice and hearing requirements
135
of the ZPL.

D. Standard of Review on Appeal for Denial of a Building Permit
In Northside Corp. v. City of Atlanta,'3 6 the plaintiff had owned a
package store since 1976. In 2003 the plaintiff applied to the City of
Atlanta for a building permit to add floor space to the back of the store.
The city denied the permit and the plaintiff appealed to the City of
Atlanta Board of Zoning Adjustment, which affirmed the director's
denial. The plaintiff then appealed to the superior court. 137 The
superior court "ruled that its own function was not to interpret [the
relevant] code section, but to determine only if the zoning board's
interpretation was reasonable. The court concluded that it must defer
to the board's interpretation of the code section because that interpretation was not arbitrary or capricious." 38 The
plaintiff then sought
139
discretionary review from the court of appeals.
The court of appeals reversed the superior court's decision. 4 ° The
court held that the superior court did not apply the appropriate standard
of review:
The superior court here had an obligation to construe [the zoning code
section] as a matter of law. "The construction of a zoning ordinance,

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-1 to -6 (2005).
Buckner, 273 Ga. App. at 766, 615 S.E.2d at 852.
Id. at 768, 615 S.E.2d at 853.
Id.
275 Ga. App. 30, 619 S.E.2d 691 (2005).
Id. at 30, 619 S.E.2d at 692.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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under the facts, is a question of law for the courts, and in construing
it the cardinal rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
law making body." The superior court erred in abdicating its responsibility to interpret the applicable zoning ordinance.141
Strictly construing the ordinance at issue in favor of the plaintiff, the
42
court of appeals then upheld the plaintiff's interpretation.
V.

MISCELLANEOUS

This section mentions five cases that share little, thematically
speaking, with the previously discussed topics, but the cases cover issues
still within the broad spectrum of zoning and land use law.
A.

Open Records Act

The Georgia Court of Appeals heard Central Atlanta Progress,Inc. v.
Baker and MetropolitanAtlanta Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Baker 4 3
together. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution ("AJC") requested documents under the Open Records Act ("ORA")"' from Central Atlanta
Progress, Inc. ("CAP") on its bid for the NASCAR Hall of Fame and from
the Metropolitan Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, Inc. ("MACOC") on its
bid for the 2009 Super Bowl game. Both requests were refused by the
companies, which denied that they were subject to the ORA as private
corporations.1 45
At the request of the AJC, the attorney general
reviewed written arguments and issued an opinion stating that "in light
of the significant involvement of public officials, public employees, public
resources and public funds in the matters, the bids were subject to the
Open Records Act and should be disclosed.""
Both companies refused
to release the documents and the attorney general
brought actions to
147
require disclosure. CAP and MACOC appealed.
The court of appeals summarized the intent of the ORA by noting:
The Open Records Act was enacted in the public interest to protect the
public from "closed door" politics and the potential abuse of individuals
and misuse of power such policies entail. Therefore, the Act must be
broadly construed to effect its remedial and protective purposes. The
intent of the General Assembly was to encourage public access to

141.
234 Ga.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 31, 619 S.E.2d at 693 (quoting DeKalb County v. Post Apartment Homes,
App. 409, 411, 506 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1998)).
Id. at 32, 619 S.E.2d at 693.
278 Ga. App. 733, 629 S.E.2d 840 (2006).
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 to -77 (2006).
CentralAtlanta Progress,278 Ga. App. at 733-34, 629 S.E.2d at 841.
Id. at 734, 629 S.E.2d at 842.
Id.
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information and to promote confidence in government through
openness to the public."
The court noted that the ORA requires that all public records, except
those specifically exempted by court order or law, shall be open for
personal inspection by any citizen of the state. 149 Public records are
defined to include all documents "prepared and maintained or received
in the course of the operation of a public office or agency" and "such
items received or maintained by a private person or entity on the behalf
of a public office or agency which are not otherwise subject to protection
from disclosure."15 ° The ORA further states that it "shall be construed
to disallow an agency's placing or causing such items to be placed in the
hands of
a private person or entity for the purpose of avoiding disclo15 1
sure."

1. Case No. A06A1028. CAP denied that it was acting "for or on the
behalf of" a public agency. 5 2 However, the trial court found extensive
involvement by public officials and agencies. Funding for bid preparation was received from Fulton County, the Fulton County Development
Agency, the Atlanta Convention and Visitors Bureau ("ACVB"), and the
Georgia Department of Economic Development. 53 Future expenditures of public funds in the form of a tax allocation district were
involved, and proceeds and state funds "in whatever form" were pledged
as part of the bid submittal." Members of the organizing committee
included numerous public officials. Bid preparation was reviewed and
approved by various public officials and public officials were involved in
promoting the bid.'55 The trial court found in favor of the attorney
general and the AJC. It found sufficient evidence that the NASCAR bid
was prepared on behalf of public offices or agencies and thereby fell
under the ORA. 56 The trial court stated that CAP "systematically and
purposefully sought to evade the Open Records Act by permitting the
public officials to review the documents, and then retrieving the records
in order to prevent them from reaching government files .... The Act

148. Id. at 734-35, 629 S.E.2d at 842.
149. Id. at 735, 629 S.E.2d at 842 (citing O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(b) (2006)).
150. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(a).
151. Id.; see also Clayton County Hosp. Auth. v. Webb, 208 Ga. App. 91, 94-95, 430
S.E.2d 89, 93 (1993).
152. CentralAtlanta Progress, 278 Ga. App. at 735, 629 S.E.2d at 842.
153. Id. at 735-36, 629 S.E.2d at 842-43.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 736, 629 S.E.2d at 843.
156. Id. at 738, 629 S.E.2d at 844.
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clearly does not condone evasive efforts such as those practiced
here."'57 To reverse a bench trial court's findings, the appeals court
must find clear error.15 8 Here, the court found none.5 9
2. Case No. A06A1028. MACOC contended that the trial court
erred in holding that it prepared its bid on behalf of a public agency. It
stated that only six of its 3000 members had government ties, only six
of the fifteen Super Bowl Committee members had affiliations with
government entities, and no public money was spent on the bid. Again,
however, the trial court found sufficient involvement by government
agencies and officials. The bid committee included numerous public
officials, many of whom wrote letters to the National Football League
("NFL") expressing their commitment to provide the public services
described in the bid. GWCC staff members were involved in the
preparation of bid documents, and the executive director personally
reviewed the bid as it pertained to the Georgia Dome and GWCC. ACVB
staff analyzed and prepared portions of the bid. The bid required future
use of public resources including the lease of the Georgia Dome, GWCC,
and parking lots owned by the GWCC Authority to the NFL at no
charge. Evidence was also presented that public agencies would provide
millions of dollars in in-kind services for the Super Bowl. 6 ° The court
of appeals, again, held that there was sufficient evidence to support the
trial court's findings that the Super Bowl bid was made on behalf of a
public agency, and therefore the court of appeals concluded that the trial
court's decision was not clearly erroneous.' 6' Accordingly, the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.'62
B.

PartialCancellationof Lis Pendens
In Colony Bank Southeast v. Brown,'6 3 Colony Bank appealed the
trial court's order denying its petition to cancel, in part, a lis pendens on
a five-acre tract upon which Colonial Bank was initiating foreclosure.'" Colony Bank contended that the lis pendens did not "involve"

157.
158.
(1997)).
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id. (citing Simmons v. McBride, 228 Ga. App. 752, 753, 492 S.E.2d 738, 739
Id.
Id. at 739, 629 S.E.2d at 844-45.
Id. at 740, 629 S.E.2d at 845.
Id.
275 Ga. App. 807, 622 S.E.2d 7 (2005).
Id. at 807, 622 S.E.2d at 8.
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property as defined within section
44-14-610165 of the Official Code of
66
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.").1
Property owners adjacent to the five acres owned by Kyle Waldron, the
property at issue, and ninety-four acres owned by Mary June Waldron
sued in federal court as a result of a man-made lake constructed by the
Waltons. The adjacent property owners alleged that the creation of the
lake raised the local water table, resulting in standing water, septic tank
problems, and a decrease in the fair market value of their properties. 6 v They further alleged that the lake was built in violation of the
Clean Water Act," the Georgia Water Quality Control Act, 169 and
the Georgia Erosion and Sedimentation Act of 1975.170 Finally, they
alleged that the construction of the lake failed to comply with an order
issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to either restore the stream
and wetlands to pre-existing conditions or implement a wetlands
mitigation plan. Money damages were sought based on the theories of
trespass, nuisance, and negligence. Injunctive relief and civil
penalties
7
were also sought under violations of the Clean Water Act.' 1
The adjacent property owners filed notices of lis pendens on the fiveacre and ninety-four acre parcels to notify potential purchasers of the
pending lawsuit.7 2 However, the lake sat on only 0.31 acres of the
five-acre tract. Colony Bank claimed that the equitable relief requested
in the federal suit applied only to the ninety-four acre tract, not the fiveacre site.'
The court determined that the remedial measures sought
in the lawsuit made no distinction between the parcels and could involve
174
the entire five-acre site.
The court distinguished Hutson v. Young, 7 ' a case relied on by
Colonial Bank, in which the court held that when a party was entitled
only to money damages-not equitable relief on the merits-the suit did
17 6
not "involve" the land and cancellation of a lis pendens was proper.
Instead, the court noted its decision in Griggs v. Gwinco Development

165. O.C.G.A § 44-14-610 (2002).
166. Colony Bank Southeast, 275 Ga. App. at 807, 622 S.E.2d at 8.
167. Id., 622 S.E.2d at 8-9.
168. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
169. O.C.G.A. §§ 12-5-20 to -53 (2006).
170. O.C.G.A. §§ 12-7-1 to -22.
171. Colony Bank Southeast, 275 Ga. App. at 807, 622 S.E.2d at 8-9.
172. Id. at 808, 622 S.E.2d at 9.
173. Id. at 809, 622 S.E.2d at 10.
174. Id.
175. 255 Ga. App. 169, 564 S.E.2d 780 (2002).
176. Colony Bank Southeast, 275 Ga. App. at 809, 622 S.E.2d at 10 (citing Hutson, 255
Ga. App. at 172-73, 564 S.E.2d at 783).
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Corp.,' in which the Georgia Supreme Court held that "land was
'involved' in a lawsuit brought by adjoining landowners for an injunction
requiring the defendants to remove obstructions of a creek that caused
unnatural amounts of water on their land."178 In this case the court
stated that "Hutson should not be construed as holding that a party
must assert a legal179or equitable 'interest' in the land in order to file a
valid lis pendens."
The court further clarified that it had not held in Evans v. Fulton
National Meeting Corp.18 0 that a trial court has the power to partially
cancel a lis pendens when the land can be theoretically subdivided into
multiple parcels.' 8 ' Furthermore, "even if a trial court is authorized
to partially cancel a lis pendens, it would not be appropriate on the facts
of this case."8 2 The injunctive relief requested by the plaintiffs called
for measures that might involve the entire five-acre tract, and as such,
8 3
potential buyers were entitled to notice of the pending lawsuit.
84
Partial cancellation of the lis pendens could not be justified.'
C.

Covenants Not to be Extended by Construction

In Crawford v. Damman,'8 5 Crawford, a property owner and builder
in a subdivision, sued the property owners' association to, in part,
determine whether the declaration of covenants and restrictions
("covenants") authorized the board to assess various fees on him. The
property owners' association is a non-profit corporation responsible for
managing and maintaining the subdivision, including all common
property and the closed-end water supply system for the subdivision.
The charges in question included a refundable $3000 building permit fee,
a $100 administrative processing fee for building permits, a ready to
serve fee of $70 per residential lot per year for the availability of water
service, and a water meter fee of $1350 for each water meter installed
8 6
by the board for each newly developed lot or lots to be developed.
After a lengthy trial process with appeals and cross-appeals, the
appellate court held that paragraph 8.05 of the covenants specifically

177. 240 Ga. 487, 241 S.E.2d 244 (1978).
178. Colony Bank Southeast, 275 Ga. App. at 808-09,622 S.E.2d at 9 (citing Griggs, 240
Ga. at 487, 241 S.E.2d at 245).
179. Id. at 809, 622 S.E.2d at 10.
180. 168 Ga. App. 600, 309 S.E.2d 884 (1983).
181. Colony Bank Southeast, 275 Ga. App. at 810, 622 S.E.2d at 10.
182. Id., 622 S.E.2d at 10-11.
183. Id., 622 S.E.2d at 11.
184. Id.
185. 277 Ga. App. 442, 626 S.E.2d 632 (2006).
186. Id. at 442, 626 S.E.2d at 636.
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allowed the board to assess owners for the installation and maintenance
of water supply and sewage disposal systems, the maintenance of water
18 7
quality in lakes, protective maintenance of lots, and similar services.
The court upheld the trial court's finding that the water fees conferred
a tangible benefit upon Crawford "because they enabled the Association
to provide a private closed-end water system" that was authorized under
paragraph 8.05. 18
The appellate court overruled the trial court's ruling that the building
fee and administrative processing fee were authorized by the covenants.189 A past president of the association testified that the builders
had been clear-cutting lots of all trees and that the association raised
the refundable building permit fee to $3000 to deter such actions. She
further testified that the deterrence was effective because the deposit
was usually returned. The $100 administrative fee was imposed to
process paperwork and to pay a consultant to inspect site development
for conformity with applicable rules and regulations.19 °
Restrictions on private property are not favored in Georgia.1 9'
Therefore, these restrictions will not be enlarged or extended by
construction, with any doubt construed in favor of the grantee. 92 The
court held that the covenants do not authorize the imposition of fees for
building permits or related administrative fees. 93
Further, the
covenants only allow special assessments to defray the cost of capital
improvement projects and require approval by a two-thirds vote of the
property owners.' 94 No such actions were ever undertaken by the
association. 95 As a result, the court would not extend the meaning of
the covenants beyond their clear and plain language to include fees not
specifically authorized.'96

187. Id. at 445, 626 S.E.2d at 637-38.
188. Id. at 446, 626 S.E.2d at 638.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 446-47, 626 S.E.2d at 639.
191. Id. at 447, 626 S.E.2d at 639.
192. Id. (citing Duffy v. The Landings Ass'n, 245 Ga. App. 104, 107, 536 S.E.2d 758,
760 (2000); Lake Arrowhead Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Dalton, 257 Ga. App. 655, 656, 572
S.E.2d 25, 26 (2002)).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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Sketch Plan Approval

In Screven County Planning Commission v. Southern States Plantation, LLLP,'97 Southern States Plantation ("SSP") submitted a sketch
plan to the planning commission for the development of a thirty-two lot
subdivision. Access to the subdivision was by way of two unpaved
county roads. The planning commission was concerned that the county
roads should be paved as a condition of the sketch plan approval.'9 8
According to section 6.1 of the county's land development regulations,
small subdivisions "consisting of six to ten lots, shall have 'paved streets,
provided, however, that paving shall not be required if all lots are
located on the right-of-way of an existing county road."" 99 The regulations require intermediate subdivisions, which consist of eleven to
twenty-nine lots, such as the subdivision at issue, to have "'paved
streets.' 2 ° ° Streets are also addressed in section 6.8, which provides
that the planning commission "'shall not approve a subdivision in a
location where the existing roads providing primary access are inade20 1
quate to serve the additional traffic generated by the development.'"
The planning commission discussed section 6.8, but it relied on
provisions in section 6.1 in recommending denial of the sketch plan
application, interpreting the regulations to require subdivisions to have
paved roads as their primary access. The board of commissioners also
denied the sketch plan application and specifically stated it would
uphold the recommendation of the planning commission on the ground
that section 6.1 required the paving of county roads. 0 2
SSP filed a mandamus action in superior court challenging the
county's decision. The trial court ruled in favor of SSP, entitling it to
have the planning commission approve its sketch plat plan for the
subdivision. The court found that section 6.1 was ambiguous regarding
whether paving was required only within the subdivision or whether it
required pavement of county roads providing access to the development.0 3 The trial court also ruled that "'as evidence was presented
which showed that the development of Runs Branch would not have a
significant impact on traffic in the area, [SSP has] a vested right to the

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

279 Ga. 404, 614 S.E.2d 85 (2005).
Id. at 404, 614 S.E.2d at 86.
Id. (citing SCREVEN COUNTY, GA., CODE § 66-181(2005)).
Id. (citing SCREVEN COUNTY, GA., CODE § 66-181).
Id. (citing SCREVEN COUNTY, GA., CODE § 66-188 (2005)).
Id. at 404-05, 614 S.E.2d at 86.
Id. at 405, 614 S.E.2d at 86.
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approval of their sketch plan.'"'
The planning commission appealed
the trial court's judgment granting mandamus relief to SSP.2 °5
Upon review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the trial
court properly interpreted section 6.1 in favor of SSP.2 °6 The court
held that the section was ambiguous, and in construing the ordinance,
"ambiguities in a zoning ordinance must be resolved in favor of the
property owner." 2° 7 However, the court disagreed with the trial court's
conclusion that evidence was presented that showed the development
would not have a significant impact on traffic in the area, instead
concluding that the evidence on traffic in the area was in dispute. °8
While the planning commission discussed section 6.8, it denied the
sketch plan only on the ground that section 6.1 required paving of
county roads.2"9
Section 6.8 grants the planning commission the
discretion to determine whether existing roads that provide primary
access to a subdivision are adequate to serve the additional traffic
generated by the development. 20 As the planning commission did not
exercise that discretion, the trial court erred in ruling that SSP was
entitled to approval of its sketch plan. 1'
E.

Determinationof PropertyLine

In Sledge v. Peach County," 2 Rauls sued Sledge to determine the
boundary line between property owned by Rauls and property owned by
Sledge. Sledge appealed the bench trial judgment in favor of Rauls
alleging that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the judgment,
and that the ruling should have been in favor of Sledge as a matter of
13
2

law.

Sledge's deed described the land's size and shape, boundaries by lands
owned by particular individuals, and a reference to a plat prepared by
"T.F. Flournoy, surveyor."2 4 The plat did not locate the property other

204. Id. (brackets in original).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. (quoting JWIC, Inc. v. City of Sylvester, 278 Ga. 416, 417,603 S.E.2d 247,248
(2004); Bo Fancy Prods. v. Rabun County Bd.of Comm'rs, 267 Ga. 341, 342-43, 478 S.E.2d
373, 375 (1996); Cherokee County v. Martin, 253 Ga. App. 395, 396, 559 S.E.2d 138, 140
(2002)).
208. Id. at 406, 614 S.E.2d at 87.
209. Id. at 406-07, 614 S.E.2d at 87.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 407, 614 S.E.2d at 87.
212. 276 Ga. App. 780, 624 S.E.2d 288 (2005).
213. Id. at 780, 624 S.E.2d at 289.
214. Id.
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than to identify it as "a 91.3-acre rectangle on the southern end of Land
Lot 15... with northern and southern [property] lines extending 2,970
feet in length and eastern and western lines extending 1,340 feet in
length (with Hatcher owning the land to the south)."215 Rauls was the
Rauls's deed to the
successor-in-interest to the Hatcher land. 216
Hatcher land described the land in part as
containing 145 acres, more or less, and composed of 100 acres off the
East side of Lot No. 14 and a strip lying North of Butcher's Branch in
said Lot 14 bounded East and South by lands formerly owned by G.C.
Hartley; West by Mossy Creek; North by lands formerly owned by
Elizabeth Howard Estate.217
Sledge later acquired the Elizabeth Howard land.218
As part of a refinancing of the Rauls property, the land was surveyed
and the property line between the Sledge and Rauls parcels was
demarcated by an old fence and by iron pins located 280 feet north of the
land lot line between lot 14 and lot 15. Sledge disputed the property
line location and began using the 280 feet north of the land lot lines.
Rauls filed suit to have the property line determined as per the survey.
The trial court found in favor of Rauls, determining that the property
line was consistent with the survey. Sledge appealed.2 19
The appellate court's standard of review for a non-jury trial of
The sole
disputed material fact is the clearly erroneous test.220
question on appeal is whether there is any evidence to authorize the
trial court's judgment. 221 "'In the absence of legal error, an appellate
to interfere with a judgment supported by
court is without jurisdiction
222
some evidence.'

Rules for determining disputed land lines are provided in O.C.G.A.
section 44-4-5:
(1) Natural landmarks, being less liable to change and not capable
of counterfeiting, shall be the most conclusive evidence;
(2) Ancient or genuine landmarks such as corner stations or marked
trees shall control the course and distances called for by the survey;

215. Id.
216. Id. at 781, 624 S.E.2d at 289.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. Id., 624 S.E.2d at 289-90.
220. Id., 624 S.E.2d at 290 (citing Schowalter v. Washington Mut. Bank, 275 Ga. App.
182, 182, 620 S.E.2d 437, 438 (2005)).
221. Id. (citing Schowalter, 275 Ga. App. at 182, 620 S.E.2d at 438).
222. Id. at 782,624 S.E.2d at 290 (quoting Schowalter, 275 Ga. App. at 182,620 S.E.2d
at 438).
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(3) If the corners are established and the lines are not marked, a
straight line as required by the plat shall be run but an established
marked line, though crooked, shall not be overruled;
(4) Courses and distances shall be resorted to in the absence of
higher evidence.223
"Traditional evidence as to ancient boundaries and landmarks shall be
admissible in evidence, the weight to be determined by the jury
according to the source from which it comes."224 Ancient landmarks
are considered to be those in place for more than thirty years that can
225
be evidenced by the "general reputation in the neighborhood."
Further, land lot lines are226 only one factor to be considered and do not
trump all other evidence.

In this case, there were no natural landmarks to establish the
boundary.227 However, based upon the evidence presented at trial,
including continuous use of the land by Rauls for more than thirty years
and a survey locating a fence line and iron pipes that were more than
thirty years old, the court of appeals held that the trial court had
sufficient evidence to support its award.2

223. O.C.G.A. § 44-4-5 (1991).
224. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-13 (1995).
225. Sledge, 276 Ga. App. at 782, 624 S.E.2d at 290 (quoting Duncan v. Harcourt, 267
Ga. App. 224, 226, 599 S.E.2d 196, 198 (2004)).
226. Id. (citing Morgan v. Lester, 215 Ga. 570, 571-72, 111 S.E.2d 228, 229-30 (1959)).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 783-84, 624 S.E.2d at 290-91.

